Polish military planners and politicians have long been concerned about potential Russian aggression, and plans were already in place to expand the size of its armed forces before the invasion of Ukraine began on 24 February — but events in that country have prompted Warsaw to move even faster with various defence procurement programmes.
On 5 March, the lower house of parliament approved a new law to spend 3% of Polish GDP on defence from 2023, marking a sharp increase on the 2022 figure of 2.2%.
Under the Homeland Defence Act, the Polish Land Forces will expand from about 110,000 today to at least 250,000 regular troops plus 50,000 in the Territorial Defence Forces (compared with 30,000 today).
On 3 March, during the first reading of the then-proposed legislation, Minister of National Defence Mariusz Błaszczak said: ‘The law on the defence of the Fatherland was prepared on the basis of the experience of the last few years, which showed clearly that Russia is able to use force to pursue its interests, to implement plans to rebuild the empire. But we did not think that the first, such drastic measures in this area would be taken so quickly.’
Deputy Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczyński said: ‘The basic premise for the adoption of the proposed law is the feeling that we have a state on the border that behaves in a way that we can already see in all its fullness today. Hence the need and the main assumptions from which we started when creating this law.’
When the Homeland Defence Act concept was unveiled in mid-2021, it appeared to be an attempt to balance three priorities. The Act replaces 14 legacy pieces of legislation dating from the 1960s, but the Polish Ministry of National Defence (MND) was also aiming to expand the size of the armed forces and procure better equipment.
The cost of more than doubling the size of the Polish Land Forces will be covered by the MoD budget, but other funds for modernisation (such as equipment procurement) will come from an Armed Forces Support Fund financed by treasury bonds, government-secured bonds issued by Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (BGK), the state budget and profits from the central bank (NBP).
BGK, which also governs the Armed Forces Support Fund, is a state development bank and the only institution of this type in Poland to support government’s social and economic development programmes.
The end result, Kaczyński claimed, is that Poland will be able to reach its 2030 defence spending level six years earlier than planned, without a tax increase.
‘The law on the defence of the Fatherland was prepared on the basis of the experience of the last few years, which showed clearly that Russia is able to use force to pursue its interests, to implement plans to rebuild the empire. But we did not think that the first, such drastic measures in this area would be taken so quickly’— Mariusz Błaszczak, Polish Minister of National Defence
Poland has already accelerated its UAV procurement plans but Błaszczak revealed an intention to buy even more uncrewed aircraft and loitering munitions. Indeed, on 28 February the MND announced that Poland will buy an undisclosed number of MQ-9A Reaper MALE UASs.
The MND is also likely to move faster on programmes for short-range air defence (Narew), attack helicopters (Kruk), MBTs (an FMS deal is in the pipeline for M1A2 SEPv3 Abrams MBTs), frigates (Miecznik), ASW helicopters and others.
For instance, Blaszczak announced on 15 March that a contract for the supply of three more Kormoran II minesweepers for the Polish Navy will be signed by the end of the first half of 2022.
With other NATO allies also planning to boost defence spending and release more funding for equipment procurement, Poland may struggle to see its orders fulfilled unless European and US defence companies expand their production capacity.
‘We know, advanced armament systems are available off the shelf in [an] extremely limited amount,’ Kaczyński said in a media briefing in late February. ‘Of course, we will try to purchase some systems off-shelf if available because we want to buy them as quick as possible. But most of [the] systems, especially more complex and the most modern [in] which we are interested, should be ordered first, then manufactured.’
He added: ‘This applies, for example, to [the] purchase of air defence systems. We are aware of this.’
Kaczyński emphasised there is a strong role for Polish industry to play: ‘Our procurement process will cover domestic defence industry products, but it will be a minority, most of the systems we will purchase from foreign manufacturers.’
The Polish government believes that its plans have been fully justified by current events in Ukraine. As Blaszczak told parliament: ‘We have created the Territorial Defence Forces in Poland. It is this type of Ukrainian armed forces consisting of motivated and trained volunteers together with operational troops that now plays a key role in the defence of Kiev.’
He added: ‘We bought Bayraktar TB2 drones manufactured in Turkey. Today we are all watching how the Bayraktars of the Ukrainian army are working. We have provided the Polish Armed Forces with Javelin launchers, which are currently also crucial for the Ukrainian Army. We have created the 18th Mechanized Division, which defends the eastern flank of the Polish, operates near the Polish-Ukrainian border and cooperates with additional American forces that have been transferred to our country.’
