Timeline
Hillard Heintze compiled a timeline of key events in the shooter’s life before the attack.
From April 1996 to April 2002, the shooter was a member of the Virginia Army National Guard and assigned to units in Norfolk in Hampton. He was honorably discharged from the National Guard.
He graduated from Old Dominion University in May 2002 and accepted an engineer position at Lewis and White.
After a year, he resigned from Lewis and White and accepted a Project Engineer position at MSA Engineering.
Five years later, he was laid-off. Someone close to the shooter said he had complained about the lack of promotion and perceived racism at MSA Engineering. He was then married and accepted a Project Engineer III position at Draper Aden Associates.
In July 2008, five months later, he resigned. He accepted the position of Engineer II for the city of Newport News.
He resigned from Newport News in January 2010.
The shooter started working at Virginia Beach as an Engineer II in February 2010.
He bought a home in Virginia Beach in January 2012. In September 2012, he received the “Thumbs Up” Award. He was given the “Excellence in Service” Award in April 2014.
The shooter received the “Team Participation” Award in May 2015 and the “Excellence in Service” Award again in December 2015.
In April 2016, he applied for and got a concealed handgun permit. Three months later, in July of that year, he bought an H&K USP45C 45 ACP pistol and a JRC JRCV067138 45 ACP carbine rifle.
He began regularly visiting gun websites on his phone in August 2016.
In September 2016, the shooter separated from his wife, the first images of weapons appear on his phone and he bought a Glock 21 45 ACP pistol.
He submitted a certification for a suppressor in October 2016.
In December 2016, an issue regarding missing contractor check’s on the shooter’s project.
From 2011 to 2017 the shooter received annual evaluations and was rated as “meets standards.”
In January 2017 a manager documented the mishandling of checks in a letter. Afterward, he emailed his supervisor that his work was above average, but his salary didn’t show that.
His wife moved out of their home in June 2017. That same month, he emailed his supervisor that he was assigned a project above his paygrade. He was then placed on a Performance Improvement Plan for deficiencies in his project management skills. The shooter said he felt “singled out” for his unsatisfactory work performance.
In August 2017, he told his lawyer to file for divorce. He successfully completed his Performance Improvement Plan. Also that month, his suppressor registration was completed.
A month later, his divorce was finalized and he texted someone close to him “finally got my suppressor today.”
In December 2017 he bought a Bond Arms Backup Derringer 45 ACP pistol and started to decrease the amount he spoke to his mom.
He began talking more to his ex-wife in February 2018.
In April 2018, he received another “Thumbs Up” Award.
The shooter bought a second Glock 21 45 ACP pistol in June 2018.
The following month, he was given a written reprimand for poor performance expectations as well as a Letter of Performance Expectations. He submitted a verbal grievance with his supervisor about the reprimand, to which his supervisor verbally responded.
He received an “Improvement Required – Performance Improvement Plan Required” due to poor performance during his annual evaluation in August 2018. He submitted a written grievance to his supervisor and to the Department Head to remove the reprimand.
That same month, he complained in a response to his annual evaluation that he is being discriminated against by being assigned projects that were above his paygrade and drafted an email that expressed concerns he was being “sandbagged.”
After a meeting with his Department Head in September 2018, he emailed the Department Head stating that he was clearly being discriminated against and asked for the reprimand to be removed. He was told the reprimand would remain and chose to end his grievance and to not to appeal to the Personnel Board.
The next month he stopped communicating with his mother and his ex-wife.
In January 2019, he used his Smart TV Guide to visit a news report about the Orland Square Mall shooting.
He visited gun conversion kit websites in March 2019.
On April 3, 2019, he drafted one work email about his perceptions of his professional relationships and stressors and another that reflected irrational and suspicious beliefs.
He browsed a premier body armor website and looks at body armor and ballistic plate on April 7, 2019. The next day, he looked at level 3A ballistic body armor panels.
On April 10, 2019, he got an email that confirmed the delivery of his purchased body armor. Two days later, he bought a Ruger rifle.
On May 20, 2019, he searched for maps of Building 2 and the Municipal Center on his computer.
He set a message on his computer on May 23, 19 that he would be out of the office from May 24 to the 28. A day later, he bought three rifle gun magazines and a rifle case.
On May 28, 2019, he emailed the Contracts Unit asking to expedite payment for a $3,027.48 contractor invoice, which the funds had not been properly assigned for.
A Contracts Specialist emailed the shooter back on May 29, 2019 asking for justification for and additional information about the purchase order and told him to email the City Procurement Officer with the request.
He emailed the Procurement Officer asking for help to resolve the issue. The Procurement Officer left him a voicemail about the issue telling him he made an unauthorized purchase and violated City ordinance.
The Procurement Officer followed up with an email that stated he did not properly follow policies and procedures and that full documentation about his purchases would be required.
The shooter played the voicemail for his supervisor and then emailed his supervisor on how he would respond to the Procurement Officer.
Another employee received a pre-dismissal letter from supervisors and a Virginia Beach police officer was posted at Building 2 as a precaution.
On May 30, 2019, the employee received a termination letter and was escorted out of the building by a supervisor.
The shooter then said he was too upset to meet with the Procurement Officer and would pay the $3,027.48 from his personal checking account to correct the error.
That night, he placed a 54-second phone call from his cell phone to his desk phone. He then called his ex-wife, in which he was apologetic, and his mother, where he discussed issues at work and his insomnia, but was overall upbeat in tone.
On the day of the shooting, the shooter left his home at 6:58 a.m. and arrived at work at 7:16 a.m.
At 7:21 a.m., he swiped his card for entry into the 2nd Floor Engineering North Hall in Building 2 and started up his computer at 7:23 a.m.
From 10 a.m. until 10:30 a.m. he searched the internet for Building 2 maps, the ECCS and Municipal Center Building Map.
The shooter then emailed his supervisor his resignation, referring to personal reasons, at 10:31 a.m. Fifteen minutes later, his supervisor responded saying he hoped the personal reasons would be resolved and confirmed that the shooter’s last day would be June 14.
At 10:49 that morning, the shooter’s supervisor forwarded the resignation email to other managers copying the shooter on the forwarded email.
The shooter swiped his card to enter the 2nd Floor East Engineering South in Building 2 at 10:52 a.m.
At 11:25 a.m. he confirmed with his supervisor that June 14 would be his last day via email.
From 11:23 a.m. until 11:33 a.m. the shooter sent routine work emails.
He again swiped his card to enter the 2nd Floor Engineering North Hall at 11:58 a.m. then 10 minutes later swiped into the 2nd Floor Engineering South in Building 2.
At 1 p.m. he again swiped his card for entry into Building 2’s 2nd Floor Engineering South. Four minuted later he left the building with two co-workers and drove to three project sites for routine inspections. They remained out of the building until 3:11 p.m.
At 3:55 p.m. he sent routine work emails and then was seen brushing his teeth in the second-floor bathroom at 3:57 p.m.
Between 4 p.m. and 4:05 p.m., he entered the south entrance of Building 2 and a witness heard gunshots, saw him with a gun in his hand and a man bleeding on the ground and he swiped for entry into Building 2 2nd Floor East Engineering South.
Between 4 p.m. and 4:16 p.m., the attacker shot Mary Loise Gayle, Alexander Mikhail Gusev, Katherine Nixon, Michelle Langer, Ryan Cox, Robert Williams, Christopher Rapp, Tara Gallagher, Laquita Brown, Richard Nettleton, Herbert Snelling, Joshua Hardy, and four other victims.
At 4:06 p.m. dispatchers received the first 911 call and it lasted four minutes and 59 seconds. The caller reported seeing a body on the ground with blood, hearing gunshots, seeing a black man with a blue shirt running into Building 2, hears more shots near his office and ends the call.
At 4:08 p.m. a call is dispatched about a man in front of Building 2 who is possibly shot and the first description of the shooter is reported as a Hispanic man on the second floor. The dispatcher can hear gunshots in the background. The shooter then swiped into the 2nd Floor West Side Business Unit of Building 2.
At 4:10 p.m. a second suspect description is sent out referring to a bald black man in a blue polo shirt. Shortly after that, the first officers enter Building 2 and K9 units and plainclothes detectives arrive at the scene.
At 4:11 p.m. the Virginia Beach Fire Department arrives at the scene.
The shooter swipes his card for entry into the Building 2 2nd Floor West Side Business Unit at 4:12 p.m.
A minute later, dispatchers send out a third suspect description referring to a six-foot-tall clack man with a blue shirt and a gun silencer.
At 4:15 p.m. the Virginia Beach Fire Department sets up a command post and the Virginia Beach Police Department establishes an on-scene commander.
Seven seconds later, the shooter swiped his card for entry into Building 2 2nd Floor East Side Engineering South.
All available SWAT team members arrive at Building 2 at 4:18 p.m. and a minute later the name of the shooter is dispatched.
At 4:20 p.m. there is a police radio broadcast that an officer is shot.
Dispatchers identify that the shooter is isolated and actively shooting on the east side of the second Floor at 4:21 p.m.
At 4:22 p.m. the Human Resources Communications Coordinator sends an email to all city employees to shelter in place at the municipal center until further notice. The email said:
We have an active shooter at the Municipal Center, supposedly in or around Building 2. Please Shelter in place. Lock your doors. We’ll communicate when it’s safe to leave. Thank you.
SWAT teams enter Building 2 at 4:26 p.m.
At 4:43 p.m. police report that the shooter is in custody. Another transmission that the shooter is in custody goes out at 4:44 p.m.
At 4:54 p.m. the Human Resource Communications Coordinator sent another email that read:
For those at the Municipal Center, please continue to shelter in place. We’ll let you know when it’s safe to unlock doors. Even then, there are roads blocked which may keep everyone here for a while. But, we’ll keep you posted. Please be safe!
First responders attempt to set up a Family Reunification Center at United Methodist Church at 5:30 p.m., but the church is occupied. The center is then established at Princess Anne Middle School.
The shooter was pronounced dead at Virginia Beach General Hospital at 5:32 p.m.
At 5:34 p.m., Building 2 is secured and there is no one else injured in the building.
Police find the shooter’s backpack and more guns on the second floor at 5:36 p.m.
Explosive detection K9s started searching the parking lot at 5:43 p.m.
The Human Resources Communications Coordinator sent another email at 5:55 p.m. that read:
Today’s situation is ongoing but the suspect is in custody. It is now safe for Municipal Center employees to leave the area. However, those who work in Bldg. 2 must remain here until further notice. Police/fire officials will inform Bldg. 2 employees when it’s safe to leave. Please drive safely when leaving. Thank you.
The Family Reunification Center opened at Princess Anne Middle School at 6 p.m.
There was an explosive sweep of Building 2 at 6:09 p.m. and was finished by 7:18 p.m.
The building was ready for forensics teams and detectives at 7:19 p.m.
Death notifications began at 9:00 p.m. and the last local death notification is made at midnight.
Out of state police officers make the last death notification at 1:00 a.m.
The Family Reunification Center closed on June 2, 2019 when the Family Assistance Center opened at the Princess Anne Rec Center. The Family Assistance Center closed on June 9, 2019.
RELATED: TIMELINE: A break down of the Virginia Beach Municipal Center shooter’s last day
Personal Background of Attacker
The shooter was born on October 15, 1978, and died on May 31, 2019, in a shoot out with police after the attack on Building 2.
His parents divorced in the mid-1990s and then his mother remarried. In 1998, the shooter changed his last name to his step-father’s last name.
He lived in Virginia Beach and the Hampton Roads Area for most of his life except for when he trained at Fort Sill, Oklahoma for a few months after he joined the Virginia Army National Guard in 1996 and served as a reservist.
He was married in February 2008 until September 2017.
The shooter also kept a low profile. There was no negative press coverage about him until the May 31 attack. Investigators also couldn’t find any social media profiles for the shooter.
RELATED: Information about the suspected man behind the gun at the Virginia Beach Municipal Center shooting
Criminal Background of Attacker
Criminal Records
Investigators were not able to find any national federal criminal records, state criminal records or international infractions, like watch lists, that named the shooter. He was also not listed on the National Sex Offender Public Registry.
Traffic Records
Between September 1997 and May 2013, the shooter was cited once for reckless driving for going 99 mph in a 55-mph zone, three times for speeding – twice going over 70 mph in a 55-mph zone and once going 63 mph in a 45 mph zone, an HOV violation and a violation for tinting films, signs, decals and stickers on windshields or windows.
Civil Court Records
There were no National Federal Civil records that named the shooter, but there was a State Civil Court record related to his divorce from his wife in August 2017.
Employment History and Workplace Interactions
The shooter began his career as an engineer in May 2002 and had four different jobs before he was hired by the City of Virginia Beach in 2010. During those eight years, the longest job he held lasted five years and he was unemployed once for a four-month period.
Early in his career for Virginia Beach, he was recognized for his work with various awards. His annual performance evaluations through 2017 stated that he “met expectations at work. Those who knew him said he was quiet and reserved and didn’t develop close friendships with people at work.
From April 1996 until April 2002, he served in the Virginia Army National Guard and was honorably discharged.
He was a project engineer at Lewis and White Associated from May 2002 until he resigned in May 2003.
From May 2003 until he was laid off in February 2008, he worked as a project engineer at MSA Engineering. During his time there, he complained about the lack of promotion and perceived racism.
He worked as a project engineer III at Draper Aden and Associated from February 2008 until he resigned in July 2008.
He didn’t work again until November 2008 when he was hired as an Engineer II for the City of Newport News. A year later, he was given an excellent evaluation from his supervisor and recommended for a raise. He resigned two months later in January 2010.
In February 2010, he was hired by the City of Virginia Beach.
Between 2010 and 2017, his evaluations were rated as “Meets Performance Standards.” In 2018, the city changed the term to “Meets Performance Expectations. His 2017 and 2018 evaluations indicated that he had challenges at work.
In September 2012, he received a “Thumbs Up” award for going above and beyond a project where he was a manager. In April 2014 and May 2015, he received “Excellence in Service” awards for going above and beyond on projects where he was listed as a manager. In December 2015 he received a “Class Act” award for managing a project despite facing “significant barriers” presented by a “challenging citizen.”
He didn’t receive another award until April 2018 when he got another “Thumb Up” award for providing HR staff a tour of Public Utilities Operations.
Risk Factors
Investigators used the Workplace Assessment of Violence Risk (WAVR-21) to analyze any risk factors that would have indicated workplace violence.
Risk factors are defined as any circumstances, characteristics, or behaviors that would indicate a person would act aggressively or violently. In contrast, there are also protective factors that decrease the likelihood someone would act violently.
Job Performance issues in 2017
Just before 2017, the shooter started to experience challenges at work. According to performance reviews, he had trouble maintaining appropriate financial and contracting records and engaging with citizens and contractors.
In January 2017, he received a letter from his supervisor about not depositing a $50 check from a contractor in a timely manner. An investigation revealed that he allowed 13 checks to surpass their “stale date” of 180 days after the issue date. He was told to contact the firms and request new checks, which he did.
According to the supervisor, it wasn’t a letter of reprimand, but a letter to record the incident. It wasn’t considered discipline, but it was serious and required corrective action.
Six months later, in June, he was placed on a Performance Improvement Plan for deficits in working relationships, project management and responsiveness to customers.
Despite earning “Meets Expectations” in other areas of the review, he was placed on the Performance Improvement Plan because he was rated as “Improvement Required” for the above areas.
The reasons for the “Improvement Required” areas were the mishandling of contractor checks, making inappropriate remarks to coworkers and demonstrating insubordination regarding instructions from management and avoiding or delaying responses to citizens about projects he was in charge of.
He successfully completed the plan in August but was still not able to maintain acceptable levels of performance when it came to his project management duties. His supervisor also noted that he did not exhibit good judgment.
In July 2018 he received a written reprimand for poor performance. He was cited for failing to perform the assigned duties as an Engineer III and was reminded there had already been several discussions to address the areas where he was lacking.
A “Letter of Performance Expectations” was issued in July 2018 to ensure an understanding of his job requirements. The issues addressed were the same issues mentioned in his earlier Performance Improvement Plan.
In 2018, he received an “Improvement Required-Performance Improvement Plan Required” rating on his evaluation.
He was rated “Improvement Required” in more areas than the year before. Those areas included:
- Working relationships with coworkers, supervisors, the public and outside contacts
- Knowledge of the field
- Compliance with city and departmental policies
- Conflict resolution
- Commitment to exceptional customer service
- Oral and written communication
He wasn’t issued a second Performance Improvement Plan, management instead referred to the Letter of Performance Expectations that was already issued.
When responding to the evaluation, the shooter initially said:
I hold my position with the City of Virginia Beach in Public Utilities Design & Construction in high regard and I appreciate those opportunities where I get to express my creativity through design. I am also happy to work for an organization that believes in diversity, inclusion, and the ethical treatment of its employees and is willing to hold individuals accountable who fail to meet these requirements.
He then submitted a handwritten comment that read:
I am in disagreement with the assigned scores and accusations. I feel that I am being placed at a different level of scrutiny than my peers. I [sic] clearly being asked in some cases to meet a level of expectation that did not exist with the performance of my job. What this means is that anything can be unfairly called into question.
The next day, the shooter sent an email to his superiors and copied it to his personal Gmail account. He wrote, in part:
I would like to revise my remarks on the Performance Evaluation Form for Employee Comments. I felt a little under the gun and I have developed a more appropriate response. I know I have an additional (30) days to finalize the document. My revised comment is listed below.
Response: I do love being a City employee, but I am clearly being blindsided and railroaded in this review which is directly related to the recent reprimand that was issued simultaneously. Please refer to my grievance in response to that reprimand. Up until a month ago, I was completely unaware that any issue exists with my performance. These allegations are trumped up and exaggerated. Below are my quick responses to the claims.
The email went on to detail a seven-point response.
He initiated a formal grievance on the departmental level as part of the HR process. He completed some steps of the process, but after starting Step 3, which would have been with the Department Director, he chose to end the process in September 2018. He did not appeal his grievance to the Personnel Board.
During the discussions about is 2018 evaluation he expressed to his supervisors and managers that he was being treated unfairly and was being held to higher standards than others at his paygrade.
Job Performance Issues Before the Attack
He was working toward complying with the expectations set in his 2018 evaluation. He did not have a 2019 evaluation before the May 31 shooting.
On May 29, 2019, the Finance Officer in the Business Division received an invoice from the shooter for $3,027.48 for work performed on a project and a purchase acquisition for the contractor or vendor for $3,027.48 for work that was authorized in December 2018.
To the Finance Officer, this was perceived as a serious violation of fiscal guidelines because the work was unauthorized and performed before the funding had been approved. It was reported that the shooter had a pattern of not following fiscal policies and procedures.
The Finance Officer noted that the shooter had the most fiscal violations of any engineer and often submitted his documents late. The Finance Officer denied the funding request and told his staff to tell the shooter that he violated multiple sections of the Virginia Public Securities Act, a firable offense. The shooter was also told he would have to get special permission from the City Procurement Officer to have the funding request approved.
A supervisor then tasked a coworker assigned to Public Utilities to tell the shooter that he broke the law and his employment could be terminated. The coworker did not tell the shooter this. Instead, he sent an email to the shooter explaining that he needed to provide full documentation about the invoice and needed to get approval from the City Procurement Officer.
The shooter then sent an email to the City Procurement Officer asking for assistance with expediting the payment to avoid incurring late fees. A few hours later, the procurement officer responded with an email and a voicemail explaining that he signed a contract with a vendor, which he wasn’t authorized to do, that all contracts need to be reviewed by the legal department and that his actions violated a city ordinance.
Someone in the Procurement Office also contacted a City Attorney about a $12,115.31 work authorization for a contractor or vendor that was signed by the shooter on how to proceed. The attorney said the work authorization could be processed, but it was ideal for a City Procurement Agent to sign work authorizations. No emails were sent to the shooter about the issue with this work authorization.
In regards to the $3,027.48 purchase order, supervisors said the shooter had a negative reaction to the voicemail from the Procurement Officer and became very upset. The supervisor said the unit management team would handle it on his behalf.
The shooter then asked a coworker for advice after-hours on May 30. He told the coworker he was busy in December 2018 right before Christmas and forgot to get the purchase order. He said once he realized the issue he tried to request the purchase order, but a coworker said it was too late and the purchasing department was “giving him a hard time.”
He claimed to have sent an email to another Public Utilities Contracts employee asking for help when he realized the issue and had 30 days to fix it. Three weeks later the other employee said he never got the email leaving the shooter with only one week to fix it. Investigators could not find the email the shooter claimed to have sent asking for help.
The coworker said the shooter was upset and he encouraged the shooter to address the problem in-person with the purchasing department and discussed paying for the error out of his checking account to correct the mistake.
The purchase order wasn’t resolved before the shooting.
A supervisor said the issue would not have led to the shooter being fired and that his job performance was positive for the 2018-2019 year and that he was going to receive a “Meets Expectations” rating on his evaluation that was scheduled for August 2019. But, the review did not happen, there wasn’t a draft of the review and the shooter didn’t know about upcoming performance evaluation.
In a phone call to his mom the night before the shooting he told her he was suffering from insomnia and was only getting three or four hours of sleep a night. He added he started taking a prescribed sleeping aid, but investigators don’t know if the medication was found by the Virginia Beach Police Department or the FBI.
Weapons Skills and/or Access
The shooter received basic and advanced training when he served in the Army National Guard.
In 2016, the shooter started to buy guns. He had at least six.
He also went to local shooting ranges to practice regularly. He usually went alone or with a family member. He also went with a coworker who said he was “comfortable and proficient” with a gun.
The shooter had a concealed handgun permit, a Heckler & Koch USPC 45 ACP Pistol, a Just Right Carbine’s carbine rifle, two Glock 21 45 ACP pistols, a gun suppressor, a Bond Arms Backup Derringer 45 ACP pistol, a Ruger rifle and three rifle gun magazines and a rifle case.
He also started to regularly visit gun websites in April 2016, ordered a bullet-resistant vest online and had a collection of knives.
Violent Preoccupations
Between May 2018 and May 2019, he conducted at least five searches on websites that had news about mass shootings. In January 2019, he specifically clicked on a news story about the mall shooting in Orland Park, Illinois.
Pre-Attack Planning and Preparation
Hillard-Heintze investigators had limited access to the shooter’s personal devices because of the ongoing criminal investigation.
They were able to find a search for maps of Building 2 and the Municipal Center campus on May 20, 209.
On May 23, 2019, he set up an automatic out-of-office email reply that said he would be out of the office from May 24 until May 28. What he did during this time wasn’t available to investigators so it’s unclear if any of the time off was related to planning the attack.
On May 31, 2019 between 10 a.m. and 10:30 a.m., he searched for maps of Building 2, Emergency Communication and Citizen Services and the Municipal Center campus map. He then sent a resignation letter to his supervisor at 10:31 a.m.
Entitlement
The shooter kept a series of emails that indicated he felt he was being treated unfairly at work.
In one email that was drafted and never sent, he talked about how one project interfered with his vacation time and asked if that would make him eligible for on-call pay. He also requested a salary evaluation via email because he believed he deserved an increase because of the crucial projects he was assigned and should have been assigned to an Engineer IV.
In another drafted, unsent email the shooter wrote that he felt he wasn’t being properly recognized for his work writing:
It’s been stated that I have all of Public Utilities most crucial projects. How can we make the department more fair and equable [sic]…Their [sic] seems to be dual standards when it comes to recognition and rewards. At one point I had [employee’s name has been redacted] close my door and tell me that I was one of the best members of the staff and then I have almost no recognition. On the other hand, I see others receiving awards for volunteering for a few hours.… I feel like I’m taking on a lot of liability with no reward or even acknowledgment, I mean that in comparison with other engineers at my level. Why don’t I get to select the consultants that I work with?
Anger Problems
Investigators couldn’t find evidence that the shooter was physically aggressive towards coworkers or others before the May 31 shooting. Rumors said that he had gotten into a fight at work, but it was revealed that another employee, not the shooter, was involved in the fight. The other employee was fired on May 31. The shooter’s drafted emails confirmed that he had real or perceived grievances toward his employer, specifically with managers and coworkers whom he worked with regularly.
Irrationally Suspicious Beliefs
While there was no evidence that the shooter sought mental health treatment or had a clinical evaluation, coworkers described behaviors that the shooter was paranoid or obsessive-compulsive.
Someone close to the shooter described him as shy, introverted and uncomfortable around others. They said he had the type of personality in which he believed that everyone was against him, characterizing him as “paranoid.”
That person described an incident at a restaurant when the shooter believed the other people at the restaurant, who he didn’t know, were talking about him and wanted to hurt him. They said he “struggled mentally.”
The shooter also installed three CCTV cameras at his home. They were inside the home and pointed outside. It’s unknown if he did this as a preventative security measure or to relieve the alleged feelings of paranoia.
Workplace Behaviors
His coworkers described him as private, disciplined, organized and, at times, inflexible. They also described some of his behaviors as consistent with OCD discussing how he brushed his teeth in the work bathroom every day at the same time.
Some coworkers said he was distant and reserved while others said he could be engaging, but all of them said that most of their interactions with him were about work and not personal matters.
Investigators did find several email threads about his personal life where he discussed his divorce with two coworkers.
One coworker did say he was frustrated with management passing him over for promotions and that they were choosing people with less time on the job believing race played a role, but investigators didn’t find any evidence that he applied for promotions or other vacancies and only found evidence of one formal grievance, which was filed concerning his 2018 evaluation.
Resignation
The shooter learned that a manager talked to others about his resignation when a coworker asked him about it.
One person told investigators that he was “very upset” that his resignation was disclosed to others, but another coworker who spoke to the shooter on May 31 said he didn’t seem to have any negative feelings about other coworkers knowing he resigned.
The shooter told the coworker he wanted to take personal time off before looking for a new job. The coworker then said the shooter shook his hand and thanked him for listening and supporting him while he was getting divorced. He said the shooter got emotional and teared up before leaving the office.
Work Emails
Most of the shooter’s work emails were routine, but there were drafted emails, that were never sent, that detail how the shooter perceived his professional relationships.
The emails seem to reflect irrational and suspicious beliefs.
Screenshots from an email written on April 3, 2019 can be read on pages 54 through 57 of the full report attached at the bottom of this article.
The email said, in part, that people don’t fight hard when they’re comfortable, only when they’re desperate and that the harder someone fights the more comfortable you should feel because it means they are near personal defeat.
He wrote, in part: “Now the pattern is first to ingratiate new or remote employees (2 or so contacts) and then have them reject you. Same as usual, but they are running out of employees to reject you. Generally, rejection is the stressor after making you fatigue through sleep deprivation.”
The shooter also stated in the email: “…You don’t threaten when you actually plan to take action, you just do it by surprise.”
Increasing isolation
Investigators discovered that the shooter was sociable when he was young, but it decreased as he got older. He didn’t have any close friends within the last decade and became even more isolated before and after his divorce.
He did not engage in work events or socialize after-hours with his coworkers. He contacted his mother consistently until 2017 when it dropped off.
History of Criminality
The shooter had no history of criminal behavior.
Retrospective Analysis
Behavior and Experiences at Work
Many coworkers described the shooter as shy, socially introverted, odd, disciplined, socially awkward, reserved and unfriendly, but others saw him in a more positive light.
Investigators learned that the positive relationships were developed after establishing rapport, that took several years in some cases, and even then the shooter remained guarded and didn’t provide a lot of personal information.
He maintained his privacy and his personal like involved conflict at times, like his divorce, that may have affected his work performance, which could be noted in the timeline of his divorce and his annual performance evaluations.
Based on his drafted, unsent work emails it seems he was struggling with issues that included his perceptions that he was a victim of favoritism and racism. He also demonstrated traits that are associated with paranoia.
Investigators believe his grievance was grounded in the way he felt coworkers and supervisors treated him based on his 2018 evaluation where he typed out a seven-point rebuttal where he provided his version and clarified each deficit defending himself from his supervisors and challenging their interpretation of his job performance.
He kept a running record of his beliefs in his drafted emails, which suggest he was becoming more fixated and preoccupied with his perceived grievances.
His supervisor noted that he was making good progress ahead of his next evaluation, but the error from December 2018 regarding the $3,027.48 purchase order surfaced and the shooter thought his job was in jeopardy.
Investigators said that when the drafted emails were viewed collectively it could have provided the rationale to take aggressive action toward those he felt wronged him.
Some of the victims of the May 31 shooting weren’t known to the shooter, but others targeted were those whom he had a perceived or real grievance. Survivors also described that the shooter spared them despite having the opportunity to shoot them.
Motivations
On May 31, 16 people were shot in Building 2 at the Virginia Beach Municipal Center and 12 of them died. A police officer was also shot while police and the shooter were engaged in a shootout.
The Hillard_heintze team said based on the information reviewed to date, they cannot definitively say why the May 31 shooting happened. They said the insight into the shooter is limited and while his drafted emails offer a limited window into his thoughts, they are open to interpretation.
In some mass casualty events, the attacker provides a clear path or detailed plan explaining their actions, but the May 31 Virginia Beach Municipal Center shooter did not write a manifesto, create a pre-recorded video to explain to the shooting or reveal his intent to carry out the attack to anyone.
Since his divorce, the shooter remained distant from family and investigators couldn’t find evidence of ongoing friendships or relationships that were central to him.
Shortly after his wife moved out in 2016, his work performance declined. Some of his coworkers and his supervisor knew about the divorce.
On the day of the shooting, he submitted his resignation but participated in normal work activities like answering emails. He was also out in the field with two coworkers for about two hours. They had no indication that later that day he would kill 12 of their coworkers and injure four others. One of them left before the shooting, the other was barricaded in his office during the attack.
Hillard-Heintze investigators identified several pre-incident risk factors for the attacker, but they’re not high-risk warnings and align with a lot of American citizens.
In their review of what the City of Virginia Beach knew before the shooting, the following risk factors were identified:
- Weapons skills and/or access – the city knew the shooter served in the Virginia Army National Guard and it can be reasonably assumed they knew he had weapons training.
- Recent job problems – The city was aware of his recent deficits concerning his performance based on his past Annual Performance Evaluations, Performance Improvement Plan and Letter of Performance Expectations.
- Personal stressors – Some coworkers and his supervisor knew he had gone through a divorce.
The Shooter’s Relationships to the Victims
Based on the shooter’s actions, investigators determined he moved with purpose through Building 2 during the attack but didn’t leave any indication of why he shot the people he did.
The common relationship between the shooter and his victims was that they were connected to Building 2 in some way.
The victim who did not work for the city was most likely “in the wrong place, at the wrong time” as he was near the entrance when the shooter entered with his guns.
Of the 16 people shot, three were managers within the Engineering Division or Public Utilities. There were interactions and/or emails between the shooter and the three managers who were shot.
Two of those managers were in his direct line of report, and aware that he believed he was being treated unfairly at work. He had only one instance of significant contact with the other manager who was shot.
Investigators believe the three managers were targeted based on their interviews.
The shooter’s relationships with the other employees and his reason for shooting them isn’t as clear. Based on interviews, he clearly targeted some individuals and he spared others despite having the opportunity to shoot them.
One witness said the shooter approached three people and had his gun clearly pointed, not at the person in front, but at another person further away.
He shot employees he had little or no contact with and for no apparent reason. Investigators couldn’t find a significant relationship between the shooter and the victim in the parking lot as well as a few others, including a newer employee who had only recently met the shooter.
Other employees put their lives at risk to warn others and get them to safety.
There wasn’t much conversation between the shooter and his victims, but some employees tried to get him to stop.
Investigators said the shooter is the only one who can explain why some people were spared and others weren’t, but he also died during the attack.
Investigators said they heard several rumors, but couldn’t find evidence to establish them as fact.
One rumor was that the victims who were shot were part of a promotion board, but the shooter never formally applied for a promotion.
Another rumor was that the shooter sought a relationship with one of the victims, but there was no evidence of romantic interest between the shooter and the victim in his work or personal email.
It’s also not known why others were allowed to live. One survivor assumed he was spared because of his work relationship with the shooter. Another believes the shooter walked away from her after pointing a gun in her face because she smiled and said hello to him almost every day when passing him in the hallway.
Could the Attack Have Been Prevented?
The shooter was a private person and did not display any concerning behaviors that are typical in mass casualty events.
The three risk factors listed above wouldn’t normally indicate violence towards others. It at least appears this way because no one reported significant pre-incident concerns.
Investigators could not find a clear link to the violence on May 31, 2019 in their retrospective analysis. Also, investigators looked at things that weren’t accessible to the city before the shooting.
Based on the limited information the city would have had access to before the shooting, investigators deemed the shooter as a Low-risk potential on the WAVR-21 risk evaluation.
