Authors: Maria Al Makahleh (Dubovikova) and Shehab Al Makahleh*
“When I thought I had already reached the bottom, they knocked from
below.”-Stanislaw Jerzy Lec
This quote of the polish aphorist and poet of the 20th
century, Stanislaw Jerzy Lec, serves as a perfect epigraph to this in-depth
2020 forecast and ideally characterises the last 5–6 years of the developments
in international relations and the crash of most of the “cautious optimism”
that has ever been expressed within this period. Pessimists are the winners of
the epoch in terms of prediction. Every time it seems that things can not get
any worse, they actually get much worse. Thaws in conflict and progress that
might take place on individual tracks are unreliable, uncertain, weak and very
temporary. Additionally, they frequently end up with no concrete and significant
results.
The system of international relations remains relatively chaotic.
Nonetheless, there are stand-alone attempts to systematise it in a way or
another at certain regional levels, especially while talking about security
issues and the need to tackle the growing security challenges. The
establishment of collective security in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
and the reformation of collective security in Europe were discussed frequently
in 2019. Emphasis was made on the clear understanding in global decision-making
circles that the ongoing earthquake can only be weathered with minimal losses
if there are attempts to keep at least some of its fragments relevant and
solid. However, none of the players can put words into real action due to
growing contradictions, even between “natural” allies. These contradictions
keep growing as old paradigms are collapsing under the pressure of
disillusionment and new challenges created by ill-management and populism.
These rising divergences with growing contradictions and decrease of
common ground between international players will lead to a rise in
confrontation. At the same time, the parties will be running out of diplomatic
or non-violent approaches to deal with the contradictions, while pushing for
decisive steps could spark violence.
General Global Overview
The year 2020 will be the most challenging and dramatic year since the
beginning of the 21st century. It will be crucial in terms of
shaping the world for the upcoming 20–25 years, laying the foundation for the
emergence of a new system of international relations through the collapse of
the elements of the latter one.
The rise of protest activities marked 2019. This tendency will gain
momentum in 2020, leading to the collapse of individual governments and coup
d’états, as well as plunging countries into the chaos of rising protest
activities. This affinity will not be only limited to the rugged regions but
will be standard for well-developed countries as well. Global confrontation
will be on the rise, making international relations more explosive than ever
before. Tension within societies is rising, while the governments are incapable
of tackling them timely and properly, as they follow outdated principles poorly
adapting to the dynamically changing world. Plus, according to statistics,
there are already specific markers alarming that the world economy is moving
quite fast to the new financial crisis that will impact all economies.
The heat in the Middle East will rise not only in terms of climatic
changes but as well due to explosively increasing challenges in the regions,
most of which are unsolvable.
The upcoming year will be more violent, and there is a high probability
of triggering new global conflicts.
One of the main areas of global developments will be the Middle East.
The Middle East was finalized 2019 with many countries on the brink of economic
and political volatility.
Since the youth form more than 70 per cent of the population in the
Middle East, increased access to the Internet and social media networks will
provide them with direct information from the source. This will put some
despotic regimes in the region at stake, as new mechanisms of demonstrations
and protests will be orchestrated beyond governments’ capacities. Intelligence
bodies in these states will fail to control digital media where the activists
will call for rallies to save the jobless youth, fight gender parity and secure
the rights of minorities, accelerating social and political transformation.
Middle East 2020: Political and Economic
Forecast
Governments and institutions will face significant challenges in the
coming few years, mainly in 2020–2021 as the world order and global trends
undergo a major restructuring process. It is expected that all Middle Eastern
regimes will experience snowballing tensions with mounting types of terrorism
and the ability of strong, asymmetric and non-state actors to negatively affect
the world order and the global balance of power.
Moreover, the social contract between Middle Eastern communities and
governments would collapse and fail as people will call for meeting further
their economic and social needs, security and prosperity (at a time when
populism is rocketing in the West), thus threatening the whole world order. The
tension between the ruling elites and citizens will reshape regional political
geography.
With conflicting principles of superpowers, the Middle East will undergo
a high risk of conflict in spheres of influence between Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Israel, Turkey and other rising regional powers which seek to play a pivotal
role in local and global affairs, attempting to shape the multipolar world.
The persistence of conflicts and the absence of real effective political
and economic reforms will not reduce poverty as oil prices are not expected to
return to the oil boom levels, forcing governments to limit cash payments and
subsidies.
Social media is likely to become the key source of revolutionary
activities and off-line coordination again, forcing the governments to shut
down the Internet as an instrument of cracking down the protest movements.
Though taking into account growing public dissent, these measures will become
less effective and in the opposite will become dangerous and counterproductive,
leading to broader civil uprising.
Polarisation vs Pluralisation in the Mena
Tenacious social and economic disparities over the coming years will
inexorably be cemented by empowering sectarian, ethnic, ideological, regional
and tribal identities. This might lead to a new wave of the Arab Spring,
similar to what was witnessed in the cases of Syria and Libya, as well as
Yemen. In the cases mentioned above, regional powers supported by global forces
acted to instigate differences to reap more benefits. This was done by dividing
these countries in order for the industries and economies of some of these
regional and global powers to flourish. By 2021, it is also expected that the
Islamic camp, which groups Muslim nations, will be fragmented, bringing about
other Islamic camps in the Far East and Central Asia, as well as Africa, to
compete with the Islamic camp led by Saudi Arabia. Thus, the competition will
not be limited to a confrontation between Shiites and Sunnis, but we will also
see the growing power struggles within the Sunni political-religious camps
(Turkey — Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Nigeria and Indonesia). Another split will
be between countries backing moderate Islam and those claiming to support
moderate Islam, but in reality funding extremist cells.
In 2020, the assiduous fading of state bodies in many Middle Eastern
countries will craft favourable environments for strengthening domestic and
international collective identities. By the same token, despotic political
regimes still ruminate miscellany as key to power and feebleness. Such
undemocratic Middle Eastern governments will proceed further with the unstated
or uncluttered split of minorities, disregarding the opposition blocs and
activists.
Proxy Wars and Protest to Escalate in the MENA
The conflict between Saudi and Iranian agents will continue in some
countries in the Middle East. Although the Iranians proved to be more skilled
in this competition, the Saudis count on American support. Washington will
continue to escalate pressure on Iran using Europe as a springboard for further
sanctions on Tehran and Iran would probably consider future moves using its
proxy agents similar to Abqaiq refinery attack in Aramco.
Political instability will continue to hit the Middle East region. While
the protests in Iraq and Lebanon will continue to achieve their goals with
international support. Many demonstrations will be fuelled in other Middle
Eastern states starting from Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, and some Gulf
nations. As pro-Iran forces control Iraq and Lebanon, Tehran is likely to
persuade its allies to make some concessions. This will require the efforts of
the Iranian Republican Guard Corps to intervene when ordered.
Thus, three main focal points will prevail in 2020:
First: the impact of global economic trends on domestic politics; the
influence of regional power struggles on unresolved conflicts in Syria, Yemen,
Iraq, and Libya. In many ways, these dynamics are interconnected and feed into
one another. However, evidence of increased contact with Russia by countries
like Egypt and Jordan should be taken in the context of the US disengagement
from the region, which began during the Obama administration, and concern about
the Trump administration’s disorganised, chaotic foreign policy. Furthermore,
if the US administration announced the “long-awaited for the deal of the
century”, this would push many Middle Eastern countries which have no
peace deal with Israel to reconcile and naturalise ties even if the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not resolved based on the Arab Peace Initiative
(adopted in Beirut Arab League Summit).
Therefore, the Middle East will witness demonstrations in a number of
countries, but without a regulatory framework to bring about regime change.
Besides, economic conditions will aggravate, leading to more tensions.
The Three Core Sub-Regions of the Middle East
The Fertile Crescent (The Levant and Iraq)
Some experts believe that different paths will prevail in the sub-region
of the Middle East: North Africa, the Gulf and the Fertile Crescent (the Levant
and Iraq). The focus will be on resolving the Syrian crisis with the victory of
the Assad regime and allies. Yet, Russian-Turkish ties will be affected by
Russian-Syrian-Iranian intervention near the Turkish border. The threat that this
would impose on the Turkish armed forces could spark a proxy war in Syria or at
least in the North-West of the country.
Lebanon and Iraq would undergo a state of great internal turmoil that
could either consolidate Iran’s power in both countries or lead to civil war by
forming a techno-political government that consists of both former politicians
and technocrats.
Having become the battlefield of the US and Iran, Iraq is risking to
plunge in into severe instability and insecurity due to regional and international
intervention in its internal affairs. It has been evident that when the Iraqi
parliament asked the Americans and the international coalition to withdraw from
Iraq, the Americans delinked the request, in a sign that whenever American
military bases are present in countries, such states will have no independence
or sovereignty to say no to the American who have the upper hand in these
countries politically, economically and militarily. As Iraqi example shows,
with the Americans threatening Iraqi government with sever sanctions Baghdad
does not withdraw its request to the international troops to pull out of Iraq,
it is clear that the first penalty on Iraq would be imposition of economic and
financial sanctions that would badly affect economic activities and cause many
financial and political issues in a bid to twist the arms of politicians and
decision-makers in Iraq to reconsider their relationship with Iran and to ask
Iranian troops to pull out of Iraq rather than asking the Americans.
In Iraq, there is little prospect of establishing a stable and popular
government that can address the population’s genuine social and economic
concerns, put an end to corruption and limit any foreign presence and
interference in the country. Instability will generate violence; government
hardship will fuel discontent and could herald the return of terrorist
activities in Iraq as many countries prefer the country to be under the
continued threat of jihadism, guaranteeing Iraqi’s allegiance to the West and
the the US in fearing the repetition of the scenario of a strong Iraq of 1980s
when the Iraqi army was one of the top ten world armies and used to have a say
in political roadmap of the Middle East region, mainly in the GCC states.
Experts forecast that Jordan’s 2020 outlook will be promising as it is
not involved in regional tensions. Although Jordanian diplomacy keeps walking
the Middle East tightrope policy, the country closely monitors extremist
factions and terrorist group leadership which seek to restore their power and
evolve into a stronger caliphate relying on social media networks to recruit
members and launch attacks. Jordanian Israeli bilateral relations will be tense
because of Israel’s intransigence concerning the Palestinian issue, East
Jerusalem and the expectation that the Israeli government would annex the
Jordan Valley, exerting more pressure on the Palestinians in this region to
move to Jordan, causing huge burdens on the Jordanian regime.
Syria will see national reconciliation due to internal and external
dynamics paving the way for this end. Yet, Syria will not return to its
pre-2011 state, as the Syrian regime will think twice before planning and
acting to serve the people, businesses, and new generations which have lived
the war and offered sacrifices. In the meantime, Moscow and Tehran will try to
make sure that their interests in Syria are not shaky after all the sacrifices
both countries have made to protect the regime and keep Syria united. The draft
constitution proposed will be approved based on the partial decentralisation of
power, which could lead to the return of many refugees from European and Arab
countries.
North Africa
North Africa will have significant turbulence, and many North African
states will be on the verge of violence starting from Egypt, Sudan, Libya,
Algeria, Western Sahara due to the flow of terrorist fighters from other
African states. The only two countries that would be safe from terrorism and
violence in north Africa are Morocco and Tunisia. In contrast, others will face
waves of terrorist activities emanating from Mali, Nigeria and Somalia and
Chad. The second version of the Arab Spring will spark in Lebanon and Iraq,
then move to Algeria and Egypt for political and economic reasons. The outcome
of regional and international interference and intervention in the Libyan
affairs would backfire on its neighbours and further terrorist groups will
arise, benefitting from international and regional rifts and disputes to settle
down key conflicts in Africa where Iran, Turkey and some GCC states will have a
proxy war that would split some of these countries based on conflicts of interests.
The GCC
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states will continue to focus on
tensions between some of their countries, Iran and Turkey. All of this depends
on who will win in the coming American presidential elections in 2020. The next
round of Israeli elections in March 2020 will help the GCC states take their
final say about their political interests once Benjamin Netanyahu become the
prime minister of Israel.
Yemen
The primary conflict in the Gulf now is Yemen, and the way to end it is
problematic for the parties involved since the war in Yemen is not
de-escalating as the gap between the warring parties remains wide and, in some
respect, unbridgeable. Yemen will continue to be a war zone, and the Houthis
will act to have the upper hand in north Yemen, rejecting any dictated agendas
to resolve the conflict as their war with other parties and countries is a “to
be or not to be”. KSA and the UAE will try through some agents to target the
leader of the Houthis Abdul Malek Al Houthi to abort the dreams of the Houthis
to have their political and military power in Yemen and in the region.
Simultaneously, the Houthis will increase their targets in both KSA and UAE and
this time by targeting entities of civic services to convey stronger messages
to their leaderships.
Kuwait
In Kuwait, there is a new government, and new parliamentary elections
will be held in 2020, paving the way for the country to have further democracy.
Yet, the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran would reflect on
Kuwait as the Kuwaiti community is divided between both regional powers.
Regarding the Sultanate of Oman, the country will continue to act as a bridge
between Tehran and the GCC countries, the European countries and the US,
working actively with Riyadh to put an end to the war in Yemen. However,
success depends on how much effort the new Sultan Haitham bin Tarek can put
into resolving these regional tensions: the Yemen war and Iranian-Saudi tension
and whether he is going to follow the path of the previous Sultan. The new Sultan
of Oman is to a great extent a replica of Sultan Qaboos’ policies.
Qatar
The Qatar crisis will be not solved as the recent meeting in Riyadh for
the GCC was attended by the foreign minister, and there are no indicators that
the dispute will be settled any time soon due to Doha’s steadfast stance.
Moreover as the recent regional developments indicate that Qatar is trying to
approach Iran at the expense of its GCC neighbours in order to be an
alternative business hub if war erupts between Iran and the US with its other
GCC allies. Furthermore, Qatar intensifies its contacts with Iran and broadens
its cooperation in a bid to advocate itself later on as a mediator between Iran
and other parties. And this will likely strengthen Qatari position in the region
in 2020.
UAE and KSA
Any military intervention in the Gulf, if any, will not probably start
before 2020 due to the many international events and meetings in the GCC
countries. The UAE will host the World Expo in 2020, and the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia will host the G20 in Al Khobar at Aramco’s compound which it considers
as an important playground to promote for itself and its modernisation in the
framework of its 2030 Vision it is implementing with much effort. The year 2020
also marks the start of the countdown to the implementation of reform programs
in Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for 2030 (Kuwait
is 2035 and Oman 2040) based on the achievement of the sustainable development
goals of the United Nations Development Program. All of these programs hinge on
the stability of the Gulf region, as any regional war would destroy all these
plans and projects.
Kuwait
The health of Kuwaiti emir Sabah al-Jaber al-Sabah is in critical
condition and this would increase the rift over the coming ruler of Kuwait in
2020–2021, leaving all options open for the Islamists to have a big say at the
political scene of the country. Though the country is deemed one of the most
advanced in the Gulf region politically as the emirate has an elected parliament
with true democracy and free press, many neighbouring countries turn Kuwait
into a satellite state. This will mark the coming era which will witness many
Kuwaiti liberals, calling for safeguarding the country from any foreign
interference.
Bahrain
As for Bahrain which is almost connected in its domestic and foreign
policies with Saudi Arabia, it is slated that Manama will proceed further with
the current trend of policies which would affect its relations with other GCC
states at a later stage including those with Oman and at a later stage with
Iraq due to the strong connections between Iraqi military groups with those in
Bahrain whom Bahrain would accuse of tampering with its security and stability.
Other Key Players
Israel
Some important geopolitical trends in the region will be marked by March
2, 2020, with a new round of Israeli elections which would decide the future
government of Israel. Indicators from Israel reveal that once Benjamin
Netanyahu wins in the coming elections, he will announce the annexation of the
Jordan Valley to Israel and this will adversely affect Israeli-Palestinian
relations and Israeli-Jordanian relations, as this move violates the terms and
articles of both Oslo (Palestinians and Israelis) and the Wadi Araba Agreements
(Jordanians and Israelis). This would be at a critical time the threats of a
regional war with Iran that would break out any moment as of summer 2020 after
the American and western sanctions on Iran weaken the political regime and turn
the Iranians against their rulers. thus, some GCC states will find it suitable
to announce open normalisation of ties with Israel regardless of any Israel
announcement with regard to the annexation process of the Jordan Valley as part
of the so-called «Deal of the Century». The result will have an impact on the
speed of development of relations between Israel and the GCC nations; Jordan
and the Palestinian National Authority will feel marginalised or betrayed by
other Arab states. Furthermore, Iranian comportment in the Gulf region (the
increasing activities of Iranian naval forces) and Hezbollah in Lebanon will be
taken seriously by Israel due to reluctance of the US administration to take
military action against Iranian forces as Hezbollah will act even if by
carrying out limited skirmishes that would lead to kidnapping some Israeli
soldiers for further political and military concessions from both the Americans
and the Israelis.
Iran
After the downing of the Ukrainian jet by Iranian forces, Iran has lost
its fora and relatively privileged positions which Tehran has gained after
killing of Qassim Soleimani which was a violation of international law. With
the downing of the jet, Iran has lost the pretexts to act against any military
provocations from other countries, fearing international outrage.
The general elections will be a sideshow for the vast majority of the
population. But a more conservative and hard-line group will likely return to
parliament to form a majority unless external interference is resorted to in
order to affect people’s will, leading to further demonstrations and protests
not only against the regime but also against its political elites and the
Republican Guards who mostly control the country’s economy. On the other hand,
there would be pro-government demonstrations and this would lead to direct
clashes between both camps.
Furthermore, the so-called reformist/centrist/pragmatic camp would have
a chance if regionally and internationally supported to change the pendulum of
politics, especially after Iran has announced its pullout of the nuclear deal.
Thus, the Western countries would find it easier to negotiate with a reformist
camp rathe than to a rightist. Tehran and Washington are unlikely to make rapid
progress, such as removing all sanctions in time. Therefore, the pressure of
sanctions will continue to shape the Islamic Republic’s policies at home and
abroad, and Tehran’s failure to protect its vulnerable population from harsh
sanctions will lead to more unrest, violence and the erosion of the Iranian
regime’s legitimacy. The sanctions have primarily secured the regime’s
policies, and this is unlikely to change in 2020 if there are no improvements
in Iran’s economic conditions and a radical change in the mindset of the
American administration.
Turkey
Turkey’s sway in regional affairs will increase. Turkey will continue to
play the double Dutch foreign policy cunningly between both Western and Eastern
camps to secure their national interests domestically and externally. Turkish
President Recep Erdogan will continue his repressive policy against any Kurdish
state by the borders with Turkey as this will have problematic political
developments. Yet, the political landscape in Turkey will be very critical with
the Republican People’s Party (CHP)’s Ekrem Imamoglu, Ali Babacan (who was
former prime minister) and former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu will nominate
themselves for presidential elections against Erdogan in the coming elections.
Erdogan is playing all political games with regional and international
powers that serve him and his party. He is cautious when dealing with Russia,
but in 2020 Russia will become Turkey’s key ally, though Ankara had been
keeping Moscow before as Plan B for next scenarios against any American threat
against political regime. Cooperation of Moscow and Ankara will intensify
shaping a kind of alliance that limits Western opportunities to have an upper
hand in regional affairs.
With Iran, Erdogan is also benefitting from the energy market, using the
sanctions imposed on Tehran. With Syria and Iraq, he seeks to keep pushing for
buffer zones to keep his borders clear and to distance Kurds from the Turkish
borders. With the approval of the Turkish parliament to send troops to Libya to
support Libyan Prime Minister Fayez Al Sarraj, the Turkish seek not to lose
their final base in North Africa to other regional powers, considering that the
loss of a presence means the loss of influence. Furthermore Turkey states clear
that it is ready to step against the US and play its own geopolitical games
freely and independently. Besides, Ankara made it clear that it is ready to
play a «bigger» and more significant role in regional affairs than ever.
Conclusions
The expected re-election of US President Donald Trump will continue to
have profound implications on the Middle East, and the inability to predict
Western actions in the region and the profound absence of a coherent policy
will affect regional actors such as Turkey, Iran and Israel. Thus, the Gulf is
slated to explode even without war on Iran because the whole region is divided
based on each country’s national interests which contradict other states.
Regarding the civil war in Libya, security will aggravate in the country, mainly
in Tripoli, unless an agreement is reached among militant groups in addition to
Turkey, the UAE, Qatar, Egypt, the USA and Russia. The impeachment process of
US President Donald Trump and the US role in the MENA region would determine
the future of conflicts in many countries starting from Iraq, Syria, Yemen,
Libya and the future government in Lebanon, Iraq and Algeria, Turkey and Iran.
It is also expected that many MENA capitals will witness protests that would
change the balance of power in the region. The outlook of the MENA in 2020
reveals that there will be a Sunni-Sunni split similar to the divide between
Sunnis and Shiites.
*Shehab Al Makahleh President
of the Jordan-based Political Studies of the Middle East Center, Founder of the
US-based Geostrategic and Media Center
From our partner RIAC
